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A B S T R A C T
Accession to the European Union (EU) demands the
adoption of a vast body of legislation. This paper analyses
compliance with EU directives in eight post-communist
countries during the Eastern enlargement and tries to
account for the puzzling embrace of EU law in Central and
Eastern Europe. Drawing on a new data set tracking the
transposition of a sample of 119 directives, the paper finds
effects of both political preferences and government
capacity on the likelihood of timely transposition. Further-
more, important sectoral differences are uncovered, with
trade-related legislation having a better chance and environ-
mental legislation having a significantly worse chance of
being incorporated into national legal systems on time.
Beyond the conditionality of the accession process, the
paper unveils a complex causal structure behind the ups and
downs in transposition performance.
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Introduction
The transformations of government and society in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) since the beginning of the 1990s have proven a fertile ground
for the study of institutional persistence and change (Elster et al., 1998;
Grzymala-Busse, 2006; Stark and Bruszt, 1998). More recently, the confluence
of these reforms with the European integration of the region presented a rare
chance to witness how internal impulses and external pressure for change
combine to produce patterns of political and policy reforms (Dimitrov et al.,
2006; Vachudova, 2005). This paper deals with the impact of the European
Union (EU) on law and policy-making in CEE. Analysing the adoption of EU
law in the new member states, I explore and try to explain the variation in
the pace of implementing EU directives during the last enlargement in eight
post-communist countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
States aspiring to become members of the EU have to incorporate into
their national legal systems more than 80,000 pages of legislation in the 
course of a few years.1 Given the Herculean proportions of this task, and the
systematic troubles of the ‘old’ member states to transpose EU law on time,
it is a genuine puzzle (and one that has remained largely unnoticed) that the
post-communist countries have been rather successful in adapting to EU law.
As Figure 1 shows, the mean transposition deficit in the new member states
(EU-10) is lower than the average percentage of non-transposed directives in
the EU-15. Furthermore, as of 2007 the best-performing countries are new
entrants and the worst performer amongst the EU-10 still does better than
the worst EU-15 country.
The contributions of this paper go beyond drawing attention to the
unlikely embrace of EU law in CEE. The performance of the new members
is not uniform and important differences across countries, policy sectors and
types of directives exist. In order to address this variation, I perform a
quantitative analysis of a new data set tracking the transposition perform-
ance of the eight countries from the start of the accession negotiations in the
late 1990s until 2005 (a year and a half after the actual enlargement). Using
logistic regression, I attempt to capture simultaneously the effect of EU-level
factors, the national institutional context and the changing landscape of
political preferences in CEE on the likelihood of timely transposition.2
National government preferences appear related to the rate of incorpor-
ating EU law. Both government positions on a socioeconomic left/right scale
and attitudes towards EU accession have a significant effect on the likelihood
of timely transposition. The capacity of governments to transpose is, however,
constrained by a high number of parties in government and bureaucratic
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quality, as well as by the regulatory environment in a country. Directives
related to trade barriers have higher chances of being implemented within
the deadline, whereas implementing legislation, highly politically complex
laws and costly directives are more likely to suffer delays.
The findings of the analysis have considerable societal relevance because
the transposition of European legislation is the basis of the internal market.
A detailed knowledge of the state of implementation and the reasons behind
the ups and downs in the member states’ performance is valuable for policy
experts, as well as for social scientists. The comparative study of the adoption
of EU law in CEE presents a new setting for applying and testing the growing
number of implementation/compliance theories, but it also provides insight
into how policy-making in transition settings works.
The article is structured as follows. The next section places the current
text in the context of EU enlargement, transposition and implementation
studies. The discussion of the contributions and shortcomings of existing
work is followed by a section explicating the theoretical arguments investi-
gated in the empirical analysis. Next, the operationalization, data collection
and research methodology are presented in some detail. The subsequent
section contains the results of the empirical analysis. Lastly, the conclusion
sums up the findings.
Toshkov Embracing European Law 3 8 1
0
2.5
5
2004 2005 2006 2007
N
o
n
-t
ra
n
sp
o
se
d
 d
ir
ec
ti
ve
s 
as
 a
 p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
al
l
EU15 (min) EU15 (mean) EU15 (max)   
EU10 (min) EU10 (mean) EU10 (max)
Figure 1 Transposition deficit in the EU (2004–2007). Mean (14.34) and maximum
(40.4) values for EU-10 in 2004 are truncated. Own data compilation based on the
European Commission’s Internal Market Scoreboards.
Theorizing transposition in the context of enlargement
negotiations
The problem of adapting to EU law in CEE is of major interest for two
research agendas: understanding the unfolding and the impact of the last EU
enlargement round, and understanding compliance in a multi-level system
of governance. The intersection of these two research areas provides the
immediate intellectual context of the current study.
Relatively few studies directly address the question of transposing/
implementing EU rules in the new member states. Studies that are built on a
comparative approach or a systematic empirical analysis are even harder to
find. One of the few exceptions is the study by Hille and Knill (2006), who
construct a measurable indicator of implementation performance in CEE for
the period from 1999 to 2003 and try to match the resulting patterns with the
bureaucratic strength of the governments and the national political
constraints. The authors conclude that ‘the functioning and the quality of the
domestic bureaucracy constitute crucial preconditions for effective alignment
with EU policy requirements’ (Hille and Knill, 2006: 549). The study, however,
employs a rather indirect measure of implementation performance – an
indicator measuring ‘the frequency, direction and intensity of criticism or
approval of the candidate countries’ performances’ as expressed in the
European Commissions’ reports on the progress towards accession (Hille and
Knill, 2006: 541). A further shortcoming is the possible endogeneity of the
dependent variable and the major explanatory factor – bureaucratic quality
as measured by the expert ratings collected for the World Bank governance
indicators. Although the use of expert scores to assess various aspects of
governance is not problematic as such, the analysts’ assessments are likely to
stem at least to some degree from the criticisms or approvals contained in the
Commission reports.
The relatively strong explanatory power of administrative efficiency 
vis-à-vis party political preferences and institutional factors is also uncovered
in an analysis of the transposition and implementation of social policy
directives (Toshkov, 2007). Measuring the legislative ‘productivity’ of the CEE
applicants in each six-month period from 1998 to 2005, the study finds
administrative efficiency to have a strong and positive effect, government EU
integration support to have a smaller but still significant impact and left/right
ideological positions to have no effect at all. Owing to the peculiarities of the
social policy sector, however, it is an open question whether these results can
be generalized to the entire spectrum of EU activities.
The adaptation in the social policy field has also been analysed in depth
in the cases of Poland (Leiber, 2007) and Slovakia (Dimitrova and Rhinard,
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2005). Leiber shows the good performance of Poland in terms of legal
implementation and emphasizes that the conditionality of accession is a major
driving force. Interpreting the Slovakian case, Dimitrova and Rhinard find
evidence for the impact of norm compatibility.
Comparative case studies possess clear advantages in addressing the
issue of cross-sector and cross-country differences in implementation
performance. Andonova (2004) examines the impact of the EU on environ-
mental policies in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland. Analysing the
performance in several subsectors, the author reveals the crucial role of
domestic industry interests in successful adaptation and the role of the
political institutions in furthering or constraining the change.
Exploring variation in a single country over time is another way of
addressing the causal structure behind transposition/implementation
performance. Working with transposition data from Poland during the time
of accession, Zubek (2005) finds that the crucial factors that speeded up the
process of adopting the acquis were the centralization of authority in the
executive, manifested in the exercise of strong political leadership as well as
the centralization of coordination structures, and the improvement in
administrative capacity. In addition, the dominant role of the executive 
vis-à-vis the legislature has enhanced performance in Poland.
The literature reviewed provides some analytical leverage in regard to
the problem of explaining the adoption of EU law in CEE. The strong positive
impact of bureaucratic quality and administrative efficiency and the focal
role the executive plays seem to be corroborated by most studies. Political
preferences and the institutional structure are rarely found to be important,
at least at the aggregate level. The main shortcoming of the literature is the
limited ability to provide generalizations. The failure to go beyond policy
sectors, countries and rather short time periods can be traced to the lack of
comparable, reliable and valid measures of transposition performance.
The main theoretical focus of the more general literature on Euro-
peanization in CEE (for a review see Sedelmeier, 2006) has been the influ-
ence of accession conditionality: the power of the EU to demand reforms in
exchange for the prospects of accession to the Union (Dimitrova, 2002;
Grabbe, 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). The impact of con-
ditionality, however, cannot explain the cross-national variation in the trans-
position performance of the CEE countries. Furthermore, it is an open
question whether the finer details of policy changes in the region can be
related to the conditionality applied by the EU. What we need in order to
explain the patterns of transposition in the region is a framework that
incorporates country- and policy-level influences, as well as EU-wide
pressures.
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Hypotheses
Implementation performance depends on the willingness and capability of
the relevant domestic actors to ‘download’, process, interpret and adapt
European rules and adopt the corresponding national legislation (Börzel and
Risse, 2003; Haas, 1998; Jensen, 2007; Tallberg, 2002). Cast at such a general
level, this thesis can accommodate all of the factors suggested by the existing
literature (and probably all conceivable factors). Nevertheless, it is useful as
a starting point in order to structure the theoretical discussion. Also, since the
implicit causal model is quite complex,3 I will present the variables accord-
ing to the level at which they operate (national, EU, policy sector).
National level: The willingness to comply
Who the relevant actors are, what their relevant preferences are and what
affects their capabilities are the main questions the theoretical argument has
to address. In the context of accession negotiations, the domestic actors that
have the greatest potential to affect adaptation outcomes are the government
in power and the bureaucracies they steer. Although the CEE countries
inherited from their communist past weak executives without strategic policy-
making capabilities, it is the governments that conduct the negotiations and
are held responsible by their electorates for the results of the talks and by the
EU authorities for honouring their commitments. Although the degree of
centralization of EU-related power by the executive (and within the executive)
varies, the governments in power are the main actors in regard to the process
of legal implementation of the directives of the EU (Dimitrov et al., 2006; 
Goetz and Wollmann, 2001).
How do the ideological profile and positions of governments affect the
likelihood of EU rules being transposed on time or not? Transposition takes
time. The European law has to be identified, translated, consulted and
adapted. Each step of the process demands time and resources, and this
implies missed opportunity costs for the government to deal with other issues.
Because directives allow a certain amount of discretion, even more time and
resources can be spent on bringing the provisions of the directive closer to the
policy preferences of governments. In short, the less the provisions of the law
coincide with government preferences, the longer a government will take to
transpose a piece of legislation and, by implication, the lower will be the like-
lihood that it will be transposed on time. Unfortunately, it is practically imposs-
ible to get information on the fit of each and every EU law with national
government preferences. At a higher level of aggregation, however, it is reason-
able to assume that the respective governments’ positions towards European
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integration and the prospects of accession should be positively related to their
assessment of individual EU rules. Furthermore, especially in the context of
accession, government support for the EU should have an additional positive
impact on the speed of transposition, because the governments will be more
willing to sacrifice their substantive policy positions in order to fulfil the
requirements of the EU and secure accession.
The link between societal support for the EU and implementation
outcomes has been proposed in the past (Lampinen and Uusikyla, 1998;
Mbaye, 2001). The effect of membership benefits, a closely related theme, has
also been explored (Perkins and Neumayer, 2007). The distinctive feature of
the hypothesis tested in this article is that it looks specifically at the impact
of government preferences.
It is more difficult to hypothesize the impact of socioeconomic left/right
government positions (for a preference-based explanation of compliance, see
Thomson et al., 2007). The body of EU legislation is quite heterogeneous and
it is difficult to theoretically derive an expectation for their impact. Still, to
the extent that a lot of the acquis implies trade liberalization and the retreat
of the state from certain industries (e.g. telecommunications, transport,
energy), left (socialist) governments can be expected to be less happy with
the implications of these reforms and thus to postpone the adoption of
implementing national legislation (Linos, 2004).
H1: Pro-European and economically liberal government preferences increase the
probability of timely transposition.
National level: The capability to comply
The willingness of governments to adopt and implement EU laws is
constrained by their capability to do so. Several sources of limited capacity
can be identified. Some of these are connected to internal government factors,
others are conditioned on the wider public administration system, and yet
others are related to the different types of EU legislation to be adopted in the
course of enlargement.
Government capacity can be conceptualized and operationalized in
several ways. First of all, when governing in a coalition, political parties have
to reconcile different political preferences. The more distant government
partners are, the more difficult it is for them to direct reforms and adopt legis-
lation, including EU-related acts. Whereas single-party majority governments
have fewer hurdles to overcome to enact their proposals, multi-party cabinets
have to accommodate more actors. The constraining effect of coalition govern-
ment can be expected to reveal itself in various ways. The number of parties
in government and the preference distance between the most extreme
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partners provide different possibilities to measure and test the proposed
impact of government capacity.
H2: Higher government capacity increases the probability of timely transposition.
The number of parties in government and the ideological distance are
closely related to the concept of veto players (e.g. Kaeding, 2006; Steunenberg
and Rhinard, 2006). However, given the broad institutional similarities in the
CEE region, the number of parties in government captures de facto the vari-
ation in veto points. Only the Czech Republic and Poland have a bicameral
parliament and the involvement of presidents in the legislative process is
broadly similar in all the countries concerned. Also, none of the countries has
a federal structure. Other national institutional features such as established
systems of relationships between government, labour and business do affect
the capability of government to steer through, and later implement, insti-
tutional and legislative changes (see Kaeding, 2006). However, in the case of
the CEE countries there is no accepted measure of the degree of corporatism
at the national level – a shortcoming limiting the opportunities to explore the
argument in this paper.
Governments do not operate in an institutional vacuum. What they can
achieve is conditioned on the broader governance system and the capa-
bilities of the public administration. Especially for the case of transposition
in post-communist Europe, it seems quite likely that the bureaucracies will
have a constraining effect on the success of EU-related reforms. At the start
of accession negotiations, all the candidate countries from CEE were still
experiencing the consequences of the political, economic and social changes
resulting from the collapse of the communist regimes (Elster et al., 1998). Their
bureaucracies, simultaneously agents and subjects of reform, had to adapt to
functioning in a completely different environment (Dimitrova, 2002). An
understanding of the implementation performance therefore has to take 
into account the political institutions and the public administrations of the
applicant countries. All else being equal, in countries and time periods of
higher administrative efficiency, the chance of EU legislation being adopted
within the deadlines should be greater. In a different twist of the same
argument, regulatory quality should also be positively related to successful
approximation.4
H3: Higher administrative efficiency and better regulatory quality increase the
probability of timely transposition.
EU level: Characteristics of the laws and policy sectors
The hypotheses discussed so far concern (slowly changing) attributes of the
applicant countries. The causal process behind transposition, however, is
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more complex and combines the influence of country-, policy- and directive-
specific variables. The policy sector and individual directive-specific aspects
can be linked to the capacity of being able to implement EU laws in a timely
and proper way.
Laws that have a wider field of application, affect politically salient 
issues and deal with complex matters demand more from governments and
administrations (see Mastenbroek, 2003; Kaeding, 2006). On the other hand,
implementing legislation that only further develops and specifies framework
rules already applied should create fewer problems and require fewer
resources to be transposed. Policy sectors regulated by complex and costly
rules are likely to be subject of transposition delays. The implied costs of
legislation should be a significant hurdle for the timely adoption of national
transposing measures and the implementation of the European legislation.
H4: The political complexity and implied costs of legislation decrease the
probability of timely transposition.
Finally, trade relations between the applicant countries and the EU
underpin the entire integration process and they should have an effect on the
transposition of the acquis because a large part of the EU body of rules
concerns product standards, barriers to trade and other measures that
regulate the trade exchange with the Single Market. Countries that do not
transpose and implement this type of legislation fast will suffer from
restricted access to the markets of the Union and thus face significant in-
centives to approximate their legislation to the acquis. Further, the removal of
barriers to trade is a process of negative integration and, as such, involves
fewer adaptation costs for the countries.5
H5: Trade-related legislation is more likely to be transposed on time.
This set of hypotheses does not represent a fully integrated theory of trans-
position. Rather, it adapts propositions introduced in the literature on
Europeanization and compliance to the case of transposition during 
accession negotiations and combines them to take account simultaneously of
the will and the capability of governments and bureaucracies to implement
EU law. In the remainder of the paper these hypotheses will be operational-
ized and the results of their empirical test will be presented.
Data and operationalization
The empirical analysis is based on a new data set derived from CELEX and
other sources. In this section the operationalization of the concepts and 
the hypotheses will be described briefly, as well as the measurement of the
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variables, the sources of the collected data, the structure of the data set and
other related issues.
Sample selection
A quantitative analysis of transposition performance requires more data than
the readily available snapshots of transposition deficits published by the
European Commission. The CELEX (now incorporated by EURLEX) database
(König et al., 2006) offers the opportunity to gather information on the indi-
vidual directive level: it is possible to follow the transposition of each direc-
tive in all the member states. At the time of EU enlargement there were
approximately 1700 directives in force that were eligible for transposition. A
random sample of 119 directives was drawn from this population. The sample
was checked to make sure that it is sufficiently representative of the entire
population of directives in terms of important characteristics such as the
policy sectors covered and the period of adoption. The randomness of the
selection of the directives maximizes the chances that the particular pieces of
legislation chosen for further study are representative of the entire body of
EU directives and that the sample is not biased towards specific types of direc-
tives. The sample was deliberately not filtered to pick up, for example, only
highly important laws, because the focus of this study is transposition of EU
legislation in general.
Figure 2 presents the temporal dynamics of the transposition of the
selected sample of directives in the candidate countries (the ‘Luxembourg’
group started negotiations for membership in 1997; negotiations were opened
with the ‘Helsinki’ group countries in 1999). It is clear that the overwhelming
majority of the legislation was transposed in 2004, although the peak for
Lithuania, Estonia and the Czech Republic was in 2003, whereas Latvia has a
more even spread. The Polish efforts are the most highly concentrated (in
2004). The drop in 2005 is an artefact of the data (because very few obser-
vations had deadlines for transposition after 2004) and does not necessarily
imply a decline in transposition rates. The sample does not allow us to draw
any strong conclusions about the post-accession phase of compliance. There
is no observable effect of the moment of signing the Treaty of Accession, in
April 2003, which theoretically strips conditionality power from the EU. Since
legislative preparation takes time, most of the acts adopted in 2004 were
already in the legislative pipeline by the time of concluding the treaty.
Dependent variable
The phenomenon of interest in the current study is transposition perform-
ance. Transposition performance can be measured in a variety of ways. First
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of all, a binary variable can be created that detects whether or not an indi-
vidual transposition process has been completed on time. An alternative
approach is to measure the duration of each transposition process, or the time
between the transposition and the deadline of the directive. Aggregating the
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Figure 2 Transposition of a sample of 119 directives in CEE over time. 
Source: own compilation. 
data over certain time and/or spatial units provides yet another opportunity.
In this way we measure the number of completed transpositions within a
temporal and/or spatial unit (or the backlog – the non-completed trans-
positions) and create a count variable. Finally, the proportion of completed
transpositions from the total outstanding cases can be computed as a cross-
sectional snapshot of transposition performance. Each measurement
approach is related with specific statistical methods of analysis and the associ-
ated opportunities and constraints for the exploration of the data. This paper
operationalizes transposition performance as a binary variable, taking the
value of ‘1’ if a transposition process has been completed within the deadline
in a certain country, and the value of ‘0’ otherwise.6
For all directives with a transposition deadline before 1 May 2004, the
effective deadline is taken to be the date of accession (1 May 2004). For 
the rest of the directives, the effective deadline is the normal transposition
deadline as recorded in CELEX. CELEX reports data on the national im-
plementing measures (NIM) notified by each member state in regard to 
every directive. A directive is considered to be non-transposed within the
deadline if no NIMs were found in the database or if the latest NIM was
adopted after the deadline had passed. Because member states sometimes
report national legislation as a NIM even when it has only a superficial
connection to the EU directive, I excluded such legislation whenever it was
possible to detect this. The procedure resulted in a total of 952 observations
(119 directives in 8 member states). Table 1 presents the distribution of the
dependent variable.
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Table 1 Distribution of the dependent variable (timely transposition)
Deadline May 2004 Deadline after May 2004
————————————— ———————————————
on time delayed on time delayed
Czech Rep. 77 32 5 5
Estonia 101 8 7 3
Hungary 71 38 8 2
Latvia 95 14 6 4
Lithuania 88 21 5 5
Poland 70 40 7 3
Slovakia 74 35 6 4
Slovenia 60 49 5 5
Independent variables
The hypotheses presented in the theory feature both properties of the
individual directives and preference-based and institutional attributes of 
the political and administrative systems of the member states.
The data related to the traits of the EU directives were again taken from
the CELEX database. The relation of a law to EU trade was considered to be
direct and significant if a directive’s subject matter included ‘technical
barriers’. The information was coded from the CELEX subject matter
descriptors field.7 An alternative measure based on the CELEX directory
classification was also constructed: legislation concerning the Internal
Market, Competition and the Free Movement of Goods, Services and Capital
(categories 2, 6, 8, 10 and 13) was grouped into one category, and all the rest
into another. The results using this measure were largely the same as from
using the ‘technical barriers’, so results based on only one indicator (techni-
cal barriers) are reported. The coding of the remaining policy sectors was
also based on the CELEX database and follows the ‘classification heading’
field. The environment sector (category 15) is usually considered to involve
the most costly legislation and it is therefore included in the model
estimation.
The political complexity of legislation was measured by the number of
recitals. Recitals Kaeding, 2006 precede the body of a directive and give the
reasons for the contents of the enacting terms (i.e. the articles). A large number
of recitals indicates that the directive has an extensive scope, as well as
addressing a high number of important issues. The number of recitals is also
positively related to the salience of a directive. Implementing legislation
implies low political complexity because it usually specifies, adapts and
updates a legislative framework laid down by general directives adopted by
the Council, or by the Council and the European Parliament.
The measurement of implementing legislation is straightforward. Direc-
tives adopted by the Commission are implementing (delegated) legislation .
As such, Commission directives tend to be of less importance and scope
(salience) than general directives.
The next set of variables stem from features of the political and adminis-
trative systems of the member states. Four measures are preference based.
Government preferences towards European integration as well as positions
on a socioeconomic left/right scale are computed on the basis of the data
provided by the ‘Party Policy in Modern Democracies’ project (Benoit and
Laver, 2006). For coalition governments, the positions were calculated by
weighting the score for each party participating in the government by its share
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of votes in the parliament relative to the remaining parties. For example, for
a two-party government with one partner holding 30% of the seats and the
other 20% of the seats of the legislation, the position of the first party will be
weighted by a factor of 3/5 and that of the second by 2/5, and the two scores
will be added to form the total score for the government. Generally, the avail-
able data covered all relevant parties, with two exceptions – for one of the
missing parties, a measure was imputed using the Chapel Hill expert survey
on party positions (Marks et al., 2006).
The party position data provide the basis for the computation of distance
measures to test the government capacity argument as well. The preference
distance was again measured in relation to two dimensions – EU integration
and general left/right position. The measure simply tracks the maximum
possible distance between a pair of two coalition partners in government.
The data on the composition of governments in the CEE countries needed
for the construction of the government preferences and ideological distances
data stemmed primarily from the European Journal of Political Research annual
country reports (1999–2006) and were checked and complemented by other
sources. Once collected, the data allow for a straightforward measure of the
number of parties in government as well.
The measures of administrative effectiveness and regulatory quality are
based on the World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al., 2005).
‘Government effectiveness’ measures the quality of public services, the quality
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of
the government’s commitment to such policies. ‘Regulatory quality’ measures
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. All the
preference-based and country-specific variables are averaged for the three
years prior to the transposition of each directive and are, thus, directive
specific. For directives not implemented within the deadline, an average score
covering the entire span of the study (1999–2004/5) was computed.
Analysis
Because the dependent variable is binary, a binomial logistic regression is
employed as the method of analysis. The model estimates the probability of
a successful (on-time) transposition given a combination of values of the
independent variables. The probability of success given a combination of
explanatory variables is transformed into the odds of success (how often
success happens relative to failure) and then the log of the odds (logit) is taken
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so that the function has a range from –  to + . The model is estimated using
the Design and GLM packages for fitting generalized linear models in R. 
An estimation using the MLlibrary package was also performed, yielding
practically the same results. The Huber–White method was used to adjust the
variance–covariance matrix to correct for heteroscedasticity and for correlated
responses from cluster samples.
Table 2 reports the results of the model estimation. Two models were
used, with Model 2 incorporating two interaction effects in addition to the
base Model 1. A positive sign of the coefficients indicates that higher values
on the independent variable increase the probability of a timely trans-
position. Negative values show that the factors decrease the chances a
directive will be transposed within the deadline.
Surprisingly, implementing legislation is less likely to be transposed on
time than regular directives. Commission directives are usually considered
to be of lesser importance, specifying or updating a regulatory framework
already laid down elsewhere. The negative relationship can perhaps be
explained by the candidate countries focusing on the more substantially
important legislation and leaving the Commission directives to be dealt 
with later. Political complexity shows a slight negative effect but the
coefficient is not significant, indicating that the relationship might be due to
chance.
The measures of government preferences have the expected signs and are
statistically significant. Legislation is more likely to be transposed within the
deadline if in the previous three years governments with higher support for
European integration have been in power. Similarly, governments leaning
towards the right on a left/right socioeconomic dimension are more likely to
complete the transposition of EU legislation on time.
The measures for administrative effectiveness and regulatory quality are
highly correlated and cannot be used in the same model. The reported results
are based on the ‘regulatory quality’ measure (the results using ‘adminis-
trative effectiveness’ are essentially the same). The effect of this variable is
positive and significant. Legislation is more likely to be transposed in
countries with higher regulatory quality (measured through an average over
the three years preceding the event).
The impact of government capacity depends on the precise conceptual-
ization used. When using the preference distance measures (over the
left/right and the EU dimensions), the effects are not significantly different
from zero (not reported). On the other hand, a model including the number
of parties in government returns a strong negative and statistically significant
relationship between the number of parties in government and the prob-
ability that EU legislation will be transposed on time.
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Turning to the sectoral differences in transposition performance, Internal
Market legislation is significantly more likely to be transposed within the
deadlines. Measured by a binary variable marking the policy sector and by
the presence of ‘technical barriers’ in the directive’s subject (the measure
reported in the model), the effect is positive and substantial. On the other
hand, in line with the hypothesis, environmental legislation, being the most
costly, is less likely to have been transposed on time. Two other policy sectors
included as controls – transport and social policy – are not significantly
different from the total pool of directives.
In Model 2, some of the more subtle implications of the theoretical argu-
ments are explored. The multi-level structure of the data allows different
interaction effects to be estimated. The paper tests two interaction effects that
are especially relevant for the major claims of this paper. Since socioeconomic
left/right positions are expected to have an effect because governments
positioned towards the right end of the spectrum should be more supportive
of trade liberalization and the retreat of the state from the economy (relative
to left parties), the effect of the variable should be greater for the subset of
Internal Market legislation. The positive sign and statistical significance of 
the interaction term between the left/right positions and Internal Market
legislation in Model 2 support this conjecture.
Government support for EU accession should have the strongest 
impact on legislation that is politically complex. The transposition of non-
controversial directives dealing with trivial matters should be less affected by
the pro-European attitudes of governments than is politically complex legis-
lation with wide implications. Precisely in these cases the willingness of a
government to forgo its own policy preferences owing to its overall support
for EU accession will result in a decrease in the negative effect of political
complexity on the likelihood of a timely transposition. The positive sign of
the second interaction term in Model 2 yields support for this interpretation.
The direction and significance of most of the effects are in line with the
hypotheses presented in the theory section. However, it is instructive to look
also at the size of the effects and to examine how much of a difference they
make to the probability of timely transposition. First of all, the range of the
predicted probabilities on the basis of Model 1 ranges from .34 to .94, high-
lighting that, even in the case of a combination of explanatory variables most
unfavourable for timely transposition, a directive still has a substantial chance
of being transposed within the deadline. A regular directive with an average
number of recitals during a two-party government and having mean scores
on the EU and left/right dimension has a probability of 86% to be transposed
on time if it is related to trade. The probability drops to 68% if instead the
directive is part of the environment field and is 79% for the rest.
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Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities for Internal Market and environ-
ment directives being transposed on time for a different combination of
parties in government and values on the socioeconomic left/right dimen-
sions, ranging from the observed minimum to the observed maximum. The
figure illustrates the joint effects of government type and preferences and
policy sectors. For example, Internal Market legislation is in general more
likely to be transposed on time than environmental legislation. However,
under a four-party government, Internal Market laws are less likely to be
incorporated within the deadlines in comparison with environmental laws in
a country governed by a one-party cabinet. Further, directives have a better
chance of being transposed on time by a coalition government that strongly
supports EU integration than by a single-party cabinet that only moderately
supports the EU. The plot provides a clear representation of the changing
probabilities of timely transposition, but it should be handled with care
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Figure 3 Socio-economic left/right government positions and the probability of
timely transposition.
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because some combinations of the variables might not have been observed in
the actual data.
Another useful way to assess the magnitude of the effect of the explana-
tory variables is to calculate the odds ratios. The odds ratio can be interpreted
as the change in the expected odds of success (on-time transposition) as the
value of one variable changes while holding the other factors constant.8 The
right-most column of Table 2 presents the change in the expected odds of
timely transposition for the variables of main interest (the calculation is based
on Model 1). Values between 0 and 1 indicate a decrease in the expected odds,
and values above 1 show higher odds of a transposition within the deadline.
For example, the odds of implementing legislation being transposed on time
are 0.70 smaller than of regular directives. Ten more recitals provide odds that
are 0.81 times smaller for successful transposition. The odds of directives
related to technical barriers are 1.63 times larger, whereas environmental
directives have 0.59 smaller odds of being transposed on time. A change of
one point on the EU accession support scale (the original scale ranges from
1 to 20) brings 1.66 greater odds and a 1 point change to the right on the
socioeconomic dimension brings 1.32 greater odds. Clearly, the relative effect
of the European dimension is bigger. The impact of regulatory quality is small,
with 0.1 change in the value of this indicator (the observed range in the data
is 0.6) bringing 1.15 greater odds of success. Overall, the size of the effects is
not exceptionally large, but a change in some of the explanatory variables still
brings substantial increases/decreases in the probability of timely trans-
position. As expected, some of these variables are directive related, some of
them capture policy-specific influences and yet others depict features of the
different candidate countries.
Conclusion
The results of the empirical analysis presented in this paper paint a complex
picture of transposition in the CEE during enlargement. Pro-European and
right-wing governments have been beneficial for timely transposition. In
some respects this finding is in line with intuitions and existing theories of
compliance. On the other hand, it dismisses the picture of EU law adoption
being a purely administrative and technical exercise. All countries might have
been willing to transpose the acquis, but those ruled by governments support-
ive of the EU and liberalization have done better. Government preferences
have been translated to some extent into the varying outcomes of trans-
position. Moreover, the party position effects are stronger exactly where
expected: in the Internal Market sector for left/right positions, and in
politically complex legislation for European integration positions.
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The positive effect of pro-Europe government attitudes is quite interest-
ing in light of the lack of a relationship (or rather the inverse relationship)
between support for European integration and transposition performance in
the ‘old’ member states (see Lampinen and Uusikyla, 1998; Mbaye, 2001). The
effect could well be specific to the enlargement period: a pro-Europe stance
is directly related to how susceptible governments are to the lure of accession
and the pressure of conditionality. The less supportive of integration that CEE
governments have been, the fewer efforts and resources they seem to have
put into meeting the transposition requirements. It is rather likely that overall
success in terms of transposition is a result of the generally very high support
for integration expressed by the governing parties in CEE during enlarge-
ment. Even the least EU-supportive governments ruling in Hungary (until
2002) and Poland (until 2001) have shown enough commitment to European
integration to proceed with the incorporation of EU law, although at a slower
pace than their more EU-supportive counterparts.
The capacity and capability of governments also appear influential on the
basis of the data analysis. In line with the existing literature, regulatory
quality has a positive effect on transposition performance, although the
magnitude of the effect is not great. A greater number of parties in govern-
ment seems to limit the capability of countries to transpose faster. On the
other hand, measures of preference distance proved to have no explanatory
value. The influence of regulatory quality, however, might to some extent be
spurious and reflect the effect of time. With a few exceptions, such as the
Czech Republic in 2003 and Poland in 2001, administrative efficiency and
regulatory quality in the region improve in all countries over the analysed
time period. At the same time, transposition is more likely as the date of
accession approaches. As a result, the measures of public administration
quality are to some extent collinear with time, leading to a potentially inflated
size of the effect. Nevertheless, this paper brings some tentative evidence that
regulatory quality has had a positive effect on the speed of transposition – a
finding in line with previous research (Hille and Knill, 2006; Toshkov, 2007).
Further theoretical and empirical research would have to address the possible
subtle interaction between preferences and capability.
Even minor delays in adopting the EU legislation in the new member
states might have important consequences for the economies and societies in
the EU. The sectoral differences in transposition rates are important because
they might lead to asymmetric adaptation in CEE. As areas of negative inte-
gration, such as the Internal Market, adapt faster to EU rules, whereas 
areas of positive integration such as environment lag behind, the market-
correcting efforts of the EU might fail to compensate for some of the negative
side-effects of European integration. Clearly, delays in transposing and
implementing the European nature protection legislation imply potential
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threats to the environment in the new member states. More importantly,
companies and business projects in a country incorporating the EU rules
belatedly enjoy a comparative advantage, because they do not have to carry
the burden of the impact assessments demanded by the EU nature protection
directives.
A direct form of conditionality related to opening trade (working
separately from the grand conditionality of access to full accession) might
be responsible for the observed swifter transposition of trade-related
measures. Interpretation of the effect of trade, however, should be treated
with care, because it does not capture cross-country or temporal variation
but differentiates essentially between policy sectors and types of legislation.
Transposition of trade-related directives is ‘negative’ integration in the sense
of removing existing barriers rather than applying a new regulatory regime.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the growing acceptance of EU rules
and standards even beyond the borders of the EU and the candidate
countries.9
Despite the importance of explaining the complex variation in the data,
the big picture of timely and relatively successful transposition of EU direc-
tives in CEE during the period of enlargement should also be kept in mind.
As the data indicate, even directives subject to the most unfavourable
conditions have had a substantial chance of being processed within the
deadline. It is an interesting question whether the drives behind trans-
position performance have fundamentally changed now that the enlargement
period is over. Further studies will have to assess how durable and how
special the embrace of EU law by the former communist EU members 
really is.
Notes
1 In contrast to previous enlargements, when some countries were given a
period of adaptation to the acquis during which full transposition and im-
plementation were in practice not expected and infringement procedures
were started against the newly acceded members only after several years, in
the case of the Eastern Enlargement there was almost no leeway for the appli-
cation of the legislation. The first infringement procedures in regard to the
new members came within six months of accession.
2 A note on terminology: transposition is the process of formal adoption of
rules and regulations that adapt the national legislation to the norms of
European directives; implementation is a broader process that includes the
formal legal aspects (transposition) as well as the practical application of the
rules; compliance, defined as acting in accordance with certain standards, is
broadly synonymous with implementation but emphasizes the exogenous
source of the rules to be complied with. The current study deals primarily
with transposition, or the formal legal aspects of compliance.
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3 Over recent years, a multitude of theories and causal mechanisms have been
proposed (and tested) in studies of transposition, implementation and
compliance in the EU. Nevertheless, most of the analyses focus on and
explore the influence of specific variables. The studies by Steunenberg (2006,
2007) are examples of the very few advances that have been made towards
revealing the micro-foundations of compliance in the EU.
4 For other ways to capture the effect of administrative efficiency and reform,
see Borghetto et al. (2005). Coordination problems are analysed by Masten-
broek (2003). The effect of parliamentary scrutiny is investigated by Berglund
et al. (2006) and the effect of administrative oversight mechanisms by Jensen
(2007). Administrative capability in EU affairs might increase with the length
of membership (Haverland and Romeijn, 2007).
5 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing attention to this point.
6 The reasons for preferring a dichotomous measure instead of a duration-
dependent variable are related to the problems of establishing a valid starting
date when the directives become ‘at risk’ of being transposed for all cases,
the level of measurement precision, and the related fact that a large percent-
age of the directives are transposed in a single period of observation, which
creates problems for duration statistical models. Nevertheless, a duration
analysis of the data has been performed (using Cox proportional hazards),
and the results are to a very large degree consistent with the results of the
logistic regression analysis presented below.
7 An alphabetically structured list of over 200 keywords based on the sub-
divisions of the treaties and the areas of activity of the institutions providing
a general overview of the content of the document.
8 For a change of δ in the values of the variable x, the odds are expected to
change by a factor of exp(βx  δ), holding all other variables constant. βx is
the estimated coefficient for the effect of x from the logistic regression model
(Scott Long, 1997: 80).
9 See the speech by the EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, ‘Openness,
Trade and the European Union’, Chambre de Commerce et de l’Industrie 
de Paris, Paris, 30 June 2007, as well as the article ‘Brussels Rules OK’, The
Economist, 20 September 2007.
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